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1 Introduction
The concept o f participation has broadened in the past twenty years. Debate on 
the highly diversified forms o f autonomy, cooperation and control within work 
organizations has enriched the sociological approach to participation after the 
initial and often simplified concepts o f direct employee participation in deci­
sion-making. These advances oblige us to pay careful attention to new develop­
ments in the labour process, not just to test achievements in already-known 
dimensions and to measure results according to already-accepted theories of 
employee participation. In radically changing social situations, sociologists face 
a more difficult - but also more challenging - task, not only in confronting the 
new reality with existing paradigms but in identifying emerging phenomena or 
fresh combinations o f former and recent features o f social development.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in Central and Eastern Europe, there were 
widespread illusions as to the prospects o f labour relations and the new role of 
employees and their interest associations. The international, economic and so­
cial conditions of the real processes o f social transformation in these countries, 
however, framed events differently. The new institutions o f labour relations and 
social cooperation displayed unexpected patterns, and social scientists are now 
seeking to understand the motives and intentions o f the social partners within 
the transformation process. Since the social and economic context o f the current 
transformation process varies from country to country in this region, very dif­
ferent strategies and practices o f institution-building, combined with national 
and local traditions of interest representation and participation, are creating a 
rich variety o f labour relations. The theme o f this paper - namely participation - 
is an integrated part of the complex system of labour relations. But this integra­
tion, in its form, contents and importance has never been homogeneous in the 
countries o f this region and it has always exhibited obvious system-specific 
characteristics.
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2 The Role of Participation in the Labour Relations System
In principle, the following institutions - each o f which has its own social and 
political weight - constitute elements o f the autonomous system o f labour rela­
tions (Hethy, 1991):
• The system o f national-level tri-(bi)partite negotiations (In Hungary the Na­
tional Council o f Reconciliation o f Interests, NCRI, was established as early 
as 1988).
• The system o f collective bargaining between autonomous partners. Given the 
lack o f autonomy o f the partners, the earlier firm-level system o f agreements 
cannot be considered to be collective bargaining, although it ensured a cer­
tain degree o f consensus between management and employees, both o f which, 
however, had dependent status.
• The institution o f collective labour action, which was non-existent in these 
countries, with the exception o f Poland and Hungary, until 1989-90.
• Employee participation took various forms in the region. One version was the 
system o f union representatives (as in the former Soviet Union); another was 
so-called ‘direct participation’ (like the self-management system in ex-Yugo­
slavia, or the Enterprise Councils which have functioned in Hungary since 
the mid 1980s). A third version was based on the increased autonomy of 
employees and their groups in work organizations (considered as indepen­
dent actors in firms’ internal labour markets), examples being the economic 
working associations -”VGMK”- in Hungary or the autonomous work bri­
gades o f Bulgaria in the 1980s. Naturally, these three versions o f employee 
participation could also coexist, thereby creating special mixes.
All four institutions o f labour relations listed above have a rationale and tradi­
tions which have influenced the functioning o f the others. In certain periods, 
one institution has substituted for others or they have exchanged roles. For in­
stance, the already substantial experience o f tripartite negotiations has estab­
lished norms for firm-level agreements in the absence o f a well-developed sys­
tem o f collective bargaining. Or direct participation by employees in manage­
ment may have partially replaced the still immature practice o f labour action.
The autonomous system of labour relations has its political, legal and eco­
nomic dimensions. National level negotiations comprise mechanisms which 
connect labour relations to political decision-making (government, unions, em­
ployers and union organizations, parliament, etc.). The economic and social 
structures underpinning the substantive rules o f the various markets are expressed 
in the system o f collective bargaining. The legal regulation o f collective bar­
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gaining and labour disputes link the system o f labour relations to the national 
system o f jurisdiction.
Participation is a field in which individual as well as collective action, eco­
nomic interests as well as self-realization, interweave. The seemingly ‘softest’ 
institutions o f labour relations comprise a scenario in which employees react to 
ongoing technological, organizational, financial and labour market developments 
in their sector. In this sphere, the patterns o f everyday workplace cooperation 
are constantly reformulated in the light o f new individual and collective experi­
ences. In influencing the decision-making process, in solving technical or orga­
nizational problems, in manipulating human relations, and in expressing inter­
ests, people not only construct their working life but create the basic conditions 
for social, economic and cultural reproduction. None o f the economic reforms 
of the past decade could have succeeded if  they had not taken account o f this 
fact; and nor can the current transformation process ignore the complex web of 
relations among these micro-worlds.
3 The Forms and Dimensions of Participation
Employees may participate in their firm’s decisions at different levels: they may 
express their opinions and interests at the level o f their immediate workplace, 
workshop or office, and at higher managerial levels. This dimension o f partici­
pation corresponds to a decision-making system which may or may not provide 
room for differing degrees o f employee involvement in a firm’s affairs.
Another dimension o f participation is the closeness o f involvement in the 
firms’ managerial and decision-making system, ranging from the exchange of 
information, through official respect for the employees’ opinions in decisions, 
to codetermination. These types o f involvement may be officially regulated by 
laws and agreements or by social practice and traditions. These latter may some­
times be more influential than legal regulations, although their combined effects 
vary from country to country, and also according to the context o f managerial 
systems or o f local, branch, firm-level practices. From the employees’ point of 
view, the intensity o f their involvement may be characterized by other catego­
ries as well. Occasional participation or the expression o f opinions in support of 
colleagues, unions or managers represent an intensity o f involvement at a lower 
level than regular contributions in the form of organized action or the accep­
tance of official responsibilities (membership o f works councils, union repre­
sentation) within the decision-making process.
As regards the aims of participation, a distinction is drawn between problems 
relating to working conditions and strategic issues. A similar approach, though
184 Csaba Mak6 and Agnes Simonyi
one more differentiated in its sociological character, is adopted when task- and 
power-oriented participation are distinguished.
All the above-listed dimensions may take the form o f direct or indirect (rep­
resentative) participation. Indirect participation is exercised through various in- 
terest-representing associations (unions, works’ or enterprise councils, bodies 
supervising pension and health funds, etc.). Direct participation takes a wide 
variety o f forms in the world. There are the forums and institutions o f communi­
cation between management and employees, ranging from quality circles to regu­
lar workshop conferences on production issues, innovations or on working con­
ditions. Since the 1970s, important initiatives have been undertaken in this area 
following the new human resource management approach. Direct employee par­
ticipation may take place through such organizational arrangements as ‘assem­
bly cells’, ‘working islands’, ‘modules’, internal subcontracting groups (like the 
Hungarian VGMK in the 1980s), where employees shape their everyday work­
ing practices and, in the longer term, the patterns of cooperation and power 
relations within the labour process.
Property partnership and financial engagement in the maintenance o f em­
ployment is regarded as a special form o f employee participation. The American 
ESOP schemes are the most well-known examples. But the various forms of 
MBO, the Hungarian MRP (a version of the American model), various com­
pany stock ownership systems, the East Central European coupon-based em­
ployee ownership system, or other direct forms o f property-sharing, also belong 
to this category o f participation. The objectives behind the creation o f these 
types o f employee participation vary from the economic to the social. Whatever 
the intentions may be, the safeguarding o f employment, the broadening o f fi­
nancial resources, the creation o f closer employee identification with the firm, 
and property-sharing can be achieved in very different organizational and mana­
gerial settings. Day-to-day participation practices within such firms do not auto­
matically increase with financial participation by their employees.
4 The Role and Importance of Participation in the 
Hungarian Labour Relations System
In Hungary, the various components o f the labour relations system have devel­
oped unevenly over past decades. In the previous political context, ideological 
and political limits were set on the development o f the first three o f the above- 
mentioned components. All three areas - the creation of national level tri- or 
bipartite negotiations and the institutionalization of collective bargaining, as 
well as o f labour disputes - were not tolerated by the still monolithic political
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system. However, there was always the need to create social consensus in the 
workplace level which favoured the development o f various forms o f employee 
participation in Hungary. The motives were very different, ranging from man­
agement interest in cooperation with the rank-and-file, through the adaptation 
and diffusion o f new managerial techniques, the ideologically motivated 
endeavour to humanize the workplace with especial emphasis on identification 
with the firm, to politically motivated attempts to introduce so-called self-man­
agement schemes in order to counterbalance growing managerial power. (These 
last-mentioned motives were especially visible in the 1980s as the political forces 
attempted to maintain control over the emerging technocrats and union bureau­
cracies who, often in coalition with managers, successfully influenced redistri­
bution processes against the centralizing efforts o f the national political and 
economic actors.) These concepts, the desire to realize them, and the life-span 
of the different forms o f participation, were subject to interaction among differ­
ent social forces at the firm and national level.
Both forms o f employee participation - the direct and the representative (in­
direct) - were widespread in the Hungarian system. The most important direct 
forms were experimentation with autonomous working units, group-level deci­
sions on wage distribution, group-based cost-saving centres, internal subcon­
tracting systems, and the widespread and highly publicized working associa­
tions (VGMK) of the 1980s. The growing role o f union representation - as ex­
pressed through the various shop steward and firm-level union committees after 
the mid-1970s, together with the creation of enterprise councils as self-govern­
ing bodies in the second half o f the 1980s - was the most significant develop­
ment in indirect participation. Having gradually obtained their participation and 
bargaining rights, the unions were anxious to see how other direct forms of 
employee participation and non-union representation could be implemented. 
They were afraid of losing their newly-acquired functions (of the 1970s) in 
employee representation, which was a well-known component o f labour-rela- 
tions systems in the industrialized countries. In Hungary, the unions’ position 
was more problematic, since they were still in a politically dependent position 
until 1989, and they felt threatened after the 1970s by non-union-controlled 
representation and direct participative forms, and by new managerial techniques 
to create direct channels o f communication with the employees.
Research has shown that employee participation was a key element in Hun­
garian labour relations after the 1970s. In its different forms it partially substi­
tuted for the autonomous institution of collective bargaining and labour dis­
putes, and, together with informal mechanisms o f interest conciliation, helped 
to stabilize the work process while creating enduring cooperation between the 
partners at the firm level. (The tight labour market situation and the organiza­
tional problems generated by the shortage economy strengthened the informal 
power position o f the work groups who played a crucial role in solving them.)
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Increased opportunities for firm-level participation after the 1970s enabled cer­
tain employee groups to accumulate important social skills in the evaluation and 
manipulation o f social and organizational situations, in negotiation with differ­
ent social partners, and in the elaboration o f overviews o f enterprises and their 
environment. These experiences directed attention to the limits o f participation, 
and they highlighted the missing elements o f the labour relations system which 
were hindering the expansion and more efficient use o f firm-level participative 
schemes.
5 Changes in the Role and Place of Participation within 
the Labour Relations System since 1989
Since 1988/89, in Hungary - somewhat earlier than political transformation it­
self - the system o f labour relations has been reformed. Labour relations have 
developed into an autonomous system as the social partners, employers and 
employees and their interest-representing organizations, have gained indepen­
dence from other political and economic organizations. The roles o f the main 
actors in the labour relations system have been clarified, and they have acquired 
the right to negotiate with each other as well as with the government. Legisla­
tion (the new Labour Code, the Employment Act, etc.) has regulated their sphere 
of action and the different institutions of negotiating, bargaining and the collec­
tive solution o f labour disputes. Recognition o f the social partners’ indepen­
dence has given rise to the pluralization o f the competing interest-representing 
organizations, so that new unions and employer organizations have been bom. 
At the national level, a Council o f Interest Reconciliation was created in 1988 to 
negotiate and agree on wage increases and social and employment issues prior 
to parliamentary debate.
These innovations in the labour relations system have been especially impor­
tant in a situation o f overall changes in the Hungarian economy. The compre­
hensive transformation o f property relations, the privatization o f public firms, 
together with the emerging new private sector, the decentralization o f many of 
the former large organizations and the profound economic recession - these have 
been the main factors o f economic transformation. In circumstances o f unstable 
economic conditions and the huge social costs o f transformation met by large 
groups, the above-described new elements in labour relations helped to main­
tain stability and sometimes even to resolve critical situations o f unrest.
At the same time, firm-level participation seemed to lose its importance. There 
were (and still are) certain commentators who expected firm-level negotiations 
and bargaining (formal or informal) to diminish in importance under pressure
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from the new phenomenon of a high level of employment. Others supposed that 
private property and capitalist management would ‘import’ the well-known 
methods o f firm-level negotiations which ‘manufactured consensus’.
Apart from these assumptions (that I shall attempt to refute later on), the 
place of participation in the Hungarian labour relations system has certainly 
changed. It has lost its political and ideological significance (local employer- 
employee conflicts can hardly be transposed into basic social contradictions), 
and its functions with regard to to firm-level issues have became more circum­
scribed. In the meantime, the social and political positions o f the partners have 
been re-established at the firm level due to various factors: the appearance of 
direct private property, the definitive disappearance o f the ‘mythologies’ o f work 
and the ‘class approach’, declining production because o f the deepening reces­
sion, and the new institutions and legal measures enabling decisions or protest 
to be influenced at the firm level. However, it would be an over-simplification 
of the situation to state that these new rights have been acquired by employees 
in a historical period in which they have lost their real bargaining strength under 
pressure from the labour market and the recession.
Employee groups in a strong position within firms can still be found, despite 
dismissals and unemployment. Even with increased unemployment, productiv­
ity has fallen, demonstrating the survival of low requirements. The high social 
costs o f transformation and the lowering of living standards have been tolerated, 
and the strike rate has been low in the past few years. Some strikes have been 
desperate revolts against the ‘non-cooperative’ management o f workers in mar­
ginal sectors and positions, while others have been mounted by powerful em­
ployee groups in order to improve their pay and working conditions.
A view widely accepted among labour relations experts is that, in periods of 
recession, when unemployment increases the number of strikes diminishes. This 
is taken to be a sign o f the weak bargaining positions o f employees and their 
unions. In this respect, Hungary seems to be no exception. While in the 1980s 
there were widespread fears among Hungarian (and other Central East Euro­
pean) political and social scientists that a fall in living standards accompanied 
by a retreat from full employment would lead to social unrest, this has not been 
the case in these first years o f the transformation period. The number o f strikes, 
participants in them and the total o f days lost through strikes, have all remained 
low in Hungary, thereby testifying to the validity of the above ‘rule’ on the 
lower level o f open and manifest conflict circumstantiated by formally weak­
ened bargaining positions. At the same time, doubts may be raised concerning 
the differentiated bargaining positions o f workers still in employment. In Hun­
gary, where the majority o f the jobless are long-term unemployed and hundreds 
of thousands are in casual employment, these facts show that those who man­
aged to keep their jobs in the first waves of lay-offs and workplace closures, are 
considered necessary for the stabilization and possible recovery of their firms.
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I now briefly describe a case which shows that there is no direct relationship 
between a given labour market situation and the employees’ bargaining posi­
tion.
6 A Managerial Initiative Rejected
The ‘D ’ Co. Ltd. was created at the beginning o f 1992 as a joint venture with 
two-thirds Hungarian and one-third foreign ownership. Half o f the company’s 
products are sold on international markets. The foreign proprietors took over 
key positions in management and launched a new human resources strategy for 
the firm. Together with the Hungarian representative o f the management, they 
were convinced that it was sufficient to give the blue-collar workers somewhat 
higher wages and better working conditions compared to the firms operating in 
the local labour market and management could rely on a satisfied workforce. 
When establishing the joint venture, the mixed management signed an agree­
ment with the local union which guaranteed employment and the level o f the 
firm’s social benefits.
The principal objective of the new management was to maintain and increase 
the company’s market share through improved quality. For this purpose they 
introduced a ‘knowledge centred’ incentive system which replaced the former 
one in which low-skilled workers received better wages than their highly quali­
fied colleagues. This innovation was linked with the introduction o f the new 
‘Quality Insurance System’, which required the support o f the workers, o f their 
unions, o f lower level supervisors, and of middle level managers.
Despite the efforts o f the new management, higher wages, better working 
conditions and stable employment, there was no significant improvement in 
productivity, in product quality, or in the level o f morale among the workers and 
within the firm as a whole. The following factors were apparently responsible 
for low morale. There were exaggerated expectations among the company’s shop- 
floor workers o f  radical wage increases; indeed, that Hungarian wages would 
soon reach the Austrian level. This ‘dream’ was fuelled during preparatory ne­
gotiations o f the planned joint venture by some o f the Hungarian managers - 
probably in order to ensure the workers’ support. Austrian wages, in fact, are 
extremely high - six to ten times higher - when linked with productivity and 
product quality, but otherwise ‘only’ one and a half or two times higher than 
Hungarian wages. The other reasons for low morale lay outside the blue-collar 
worker’s community and within management. After the creation of “D” Co. 
Ltd., the new top management of the Hungarian-Austrian joint venture intro­
duced a management style based on the ‘autocratic’ version. From a technical
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point of view, these decisions were well prepared and elaborated. But they lacked 
the participation not only of the workers and unions but also o f the middle 
managers, who had played an important role in the decision-making process of 
the former publicly-owned firm but were now entirely excluded from the deci­
sions taken by top management. Thus, this important sector o f management 
could not and did not identify with the firm’s management decisions. In this 
type o f decision-making system, both blue collar workers and managers are 
merely ‘executors’, they are not ‘co-creators’ of the firm’s policy aimed at chang­
ing the incentive system, quality assurance, and to introduce a new practice of 
manpower use. The management o f “D” Co. Ltd. first made an appropriate di­
agnosis: they thought that the lack o f cooperation between workers and manag­
ers was the result o f communication difficulties. To overcome this human rela­
tions problem, the management introduced an open policy initiative by asking 
the workers to inform them about their interests and the topics that they wished 
to read about in the company’s newspaper. In order to collect the workers’ opin­
ions on managerial initiatives, “sealed mail boxes” were placed in each work­
shop in “D” Co. Ltd. Two months later, before publication of the next issue of 
the company’s newspaper, the manager responsible for communication between 
management and the rank-and-file attempted to gather the workers’ opinions. 
But the overall results o f the campaign were as follows: “Three blank slips of 
paper and a pigeon feather”. After this complete failure o f its initiative to im­
prove communication and open dialogue with the workers, the management 
realized that, within its ranks, the middle managers were more on the side o f the 
workers than o f top management. The trade-union plant-level organization pur­
sued a policy o f ‘confrontation’ with the top management’s initiatives and, in 
this respect, the middle managers supported union action against management. 
In the absence o f overall consensus between rank-and-file, middle managers 
and top management, the employees refused a minor offer by the management 
for participation and applied pressure to influence wider issues o f working con­
ditions. If one examines not only certain isolated phenomena o f participation or 
non-participation (refusal to participate) but also the dynamics o f “everyday 
workplace events” and continuous changes in the relationships between the part­
ners, one finds that employees realized their interests through both open and 
hidden forms o f participation.
After the failure o f the above-mentioned managerial campaign to improve 
communication with the workforce, shop-floor workers and middle managers 
achieved success in various important areas - for instance, by signing the first 
Collective Agreement o f June 1994. The top managers - or key figures in the 
company’s executive management - were forced to recognize the necessity of 
building the social consensus o f their partners. Establishing stable agreement 
with the workers and the unions would identify not only the interest- and power- 
relations among the workers and between the workers and the trade union but
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also within the management. With regard to this latter aspect, it was crucial to 
realize that the ‘malaise’ o f the middle managers was due their lack o f participa­
tion in the firm’s decision-making process. The initial diagnosis identified the 
tensions between managers and workers as psychological in character (misun­
derstandings, difficulties of communication, etc.). However, after a one-and-a- 
half year ‘learning process’, management discovered the true nature o f the prob­
lem: that is, the key role o f interests and power relations. It became obvious that 
the ‘core workers’ (and the union leaders) or the middle managers would not 
voluntarily practice self-restraint or give up their ‘strong positions’ in the deci- 
sion-making system created in the former state company. Within this social con­
text, the rejection o f the management’s proposed form o f participation - collec­
tion of workers’ suggestions and their publication in the company newspaper - 
is understandable. The different forms o f employee participation (the voicing of 
opinions in the newspaper, work’s council since 1993, etc.) are an important 
component o f firm-level labour relations. However, these participatory instru­
ments cannot substitute for collective bargaining or social consensus based on 
the concertation o f interests and power among the social partners. In this regard, 
it is worth noting that collective bargaining and labour disputes are the best 
known system o f short-term interest conciliation between the employer and 
employees. The role and function of participation are also linked to interest 
relations and power relations, but from a long-term rather than short-term per­
spective (Gabor Furedi (1994).
7 Combining ‘Voice’ and ‘Loyalty’
In a situation o f profound crisis between the social partners in a firm, participa­
tion can substitute - temporarily - for collective bargaining. In the case of ‘C ’ 
Co. Ltd., which operated in the textiles industry, a seemingly paradoxical situa­
tion has been described: resistence and strong protest combined with coopera­
tive participation. (Orolin, 1994)
‘C ’ Co.Ltd. was established in the autumn of 1990, with 50% Hungarian and 
50% Italian capital. The objective o f Italians was both to acquire markets and to 
gain long-term profit based on low wages. (At present the average wage in ‘C’ 
Co. Ltd. is a little more than one-eighth of the average in the Italian plants o f the 
foreign investors.) The priorities o f the Italian owners can be summed up as 
follows: order, discipline, quality and profit. Within an extremely short period 
of time, the workforce was cut to 30%. Before privatization, 1000 workers pro­
duced 80,000 metres per day o f different textiles. In the new Italian-Hungarian 
firm, this quantity was produced in a month by the 300 workers that remained.
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In parallel with this decline in employment and production, the influence o f the 
former trade union was eroded. The changes in the ownership structure resulted 
not only in an increased intensity o f work and slow wage growth increase but 
also, surprisingly, in badly organized work and worsening working conditions. 
Preparation for the privatization o f the former state textile (weaving mill) com­
pany was carried out in a “climate o f secrecy”: nobody was informed about the 
privatization plan. The employees therefore thought that everything was against 
them. In everyday factory life, the ‘Italian trainers’ treated the Hungarian textile 
workers as ‘third rate workers’ and showed no respect for them: even joking and 
chatting were prohibited during working hours. After two and a half years of 
unsuccessful attempts by the workers to reach collective agreement on job clas­
sification and wage increases - in an industry in which male workers were paid 
the lowest industrial wage - the workers staged a ‘warning strike’ in October 
1993, and later a longer strike in December o f the same year. (The degree of 
support for the strike was 90% in the plant situated in the capital, and 100 % in 
the plant operating in a regional centre.) Despite the strikes, the Italian owners - 
who during the two and a half years had increased their property share and had 
become the dominant owner - finally agreed to a 12% basic wage increase and 
an 8% quality bonus (premium), but they did not sign the collective agreement.
To understand the economic performance o f “C” Co. Ltd. one must bear in 
mind its huge indebtedness (100 million Ft) due to the shrinking market. In this 
situation, the very survival o f the firm was at stake. The workers were strongly 
aware o f the firm’s imminent bankruptcy: for them, the real threat was not the 
signing o f the collective agreement but the survival o f the firm and hence the 
saving o f their jobs. The situation was aggravated by the constant violation of 
the Hungarian labour code by the Italian director - who was unaware o f Hungar­
ian law regulating labour relations. Even in these circumstances o f conflictual 
labour relations, the workers participating in the strike expressed their commit­
ment to and strong identification with the firm. This emerges clearly on reading 
extracts from the ‘memo’ drawn up by the Worker’s Assembly during the warn­
ing strike:
“Beyond the disorganization of work, there are numerous deficiencies and mistakes in the techno­
logical instructions for which the worker’s collective cannot take responsibility. Employees, guided 
by professional self-esteem and by the risk o f losing their jobs in the case of plant closure due to 
bankruptcy, tried to warn the decision-makers o f the Co. Ltd. in time to avoid damage caused by the 
inappropriate technological instructions. The worker’s assembly cannot accept and rejects the Ital­
ian organizers’ often abusive behaviour towards the workers ...” (Orolin, 1994: p . ).
Hence workers’ participation in this case has a twofold character. On the one 
hand there is strong protest which even takes the form o f strikes for agreement 
to be reached on the most important issues o f working conditions, employment
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and wages. On the other, workers constantly participate in solving the techno­
logical and organizational difficulties of the plant.
Those forms o f participation consisting of strong protest or a rejection of 
managerial initiatives, and the forceful representation of employee interests, 
may give rise to formal collective labour disputes. With reference to already- 
mentioned elements o f Hungarian labour relations, we may say that employee 
participation may either provoke or prevent the escalation o f labour disputes 
into strikes. The distinctive feature o f Hungarian labour relations is the low 
level of strike activity compared with the other countries undergoing transfor­
mation in Central and Eastern Europe.
According to the research report compiled by the Phare Project Fact Finding 
Committee in 1993, which examined different forms o f participation and com­
pared views and interests, in many cases the threat of strike action leads to the 
settlement o f conflicts. In 30% of cases, formal strike calls were not followed by 
strikes, and peaceful solutions were found instead. In particular, broader and 
branch-wide strikes (for instance in the railway or the electricity generating 
sectors) were prevented by agreements reached after the strike had been called. 
As collective labour disputes were being prepared, the social partners conducted 
intensive negotiation, either directly or through their representatives, in order to 
establish the pre-conditions for further cooperation. In 1993, eleven branch- 
level wage agreements were reached, covering 5% of all the employees. Alto­
gether, around 16% o f the labour force was affected by such agreements (Berki, 
1994).
In some o f the multinationals to have established plants in Hungary (in the 
form o f ‘green field’ investments), different forms o f employees resistance have 
led to important wage agreements and to the establishment o f the first smaller 
local unions, thereby emphasising the importance o f the works’ councils. The 
labour relations system o f the multinationals operating in Hungary modulates 
between their national traditions, international contexts and Hungarian devel­
opment (Neuman, 1993).
8 Changes Towards a Three-dimensional System of 
Participation
As a new element in the changing labour relations system since 1993, especial 
mention should be made o f the works’ councils. These are institutions which 
provide representation for the entire workforce; and they have had several pre­
decessors in Hungary: in 1918-19, between 1945 and 1948, in 1956, and in 
different revolutionary periods as institutions ensuring workers’ control when
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managerial influence has weakened. Despite obvious differences in social, eco­
nomic and historical circumstances, several common institutional features can 
be discerned in their reappearance and functioning:
• Workers’ councils were created in revolutionary situations when the tradi­
tional institutions of political democracy were paralysed, and when radical 
changes in property relations had created a vacuum and instability in man­
agement.
• This form o f workers ’ self-management was designed to integrate the contra­
dictory roles o f employers and employees. The intention was to defend the 
employees’ interests (as with any traditional union) while taking over mana­
gerial responsibilities (in organizing production). In 1919, for example, work­
ers ’ councils were responsible for labour discipline, defence of socialized 
property, and production control.
• These councils have never restricted their action to the firm level, but seek to 
establish ties both horizontally and vertically in order to gain political control 
over the national economy: partly because of their ambitious and contradic­
tory aims and partly in order to stabilize the political, social and managerial 
institutions, i.e. parliament, unions, private and public property (Varga, 1989).
In 1992, the Labour Code prescribed the creation o f works’ councils as obliga­
tory in all firms in order to ensure employee participation in work-related deci­
sions. Works’ councils were to be elected in firms with more than fifty employ­
ees - and works’ delegates in smaller firms with more than fifteen employees - 
by secret ballot for a three-year period. The candidates were to be nominated by 
the unions or other groups o f employees. These councils have the following 
rights:
• co-determination of the firm’s social welfare decisions;
• the expression o f employees’ opinions on managerial decisions concerning 
reorganization, privatization, the use o f human resources, vocational training 
and retraining, new working methods, and so on;
• information provided at least twice a year on the firm’s economic situation, 
on investments, wages, liquidity, etc. At the same time, these councils cannot 
organize and support strikes.
The institution o f works’ councils represents a radical break with the past when 
the trade union’s function o f employee interest representation and participation 
were confused. The new Labour Code separates the main function o f the unions 
(interest-bargaining) from participation by employees. According to the Labour 
Code: “ Participative rights are exercised in the employees’ name by works’
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council or works’ delegates elected by them.” (Labour Code, 1992: chap. IV. 
par. 42).
Besides participation in interest representation and bargaining through the 
unions, the works’ councils in their present form can be regarded as a second 
institution for employee participation. The mandatory system has certain simi­
larities to those in other countries (like Germany or Austria) with a so-called 
‘dual system’ o f labour relations. It is expected to develop social norms and 
rules o f the game for long-term conflict resolution between the social partners at 
the firm level. The outcome o f these rules may foster cooperation between em­
ployers and employees and among their different groups.
Owing to the short life o f the works’ councils, it would be premature to evaluate 
their activity. The first ballot in 1993 redefined the representativeness o f the 
different union confederations. O f the eight trade union federations, MSZOSZ 
received 71%, the Autonomous Unions 18%, and the Democratic League of 
Independent Unions 6%, o f votes during the works’ councils elections. There 
are signs that trade unions consider the works’ councils to be their rivals in 
influencing decision-making at the firm level. This is due to the as yet incom­
plete divison o f labour between the two institutions which would formally sepa­
rate bargaining and cooperation.
Mention should finally be made o f a new element in employee participation 
as a social product o f spreading innovative managerial techniques in the field of 
human resources. In the vacuum o f labour relations immediately after political 
trasformation, the need for everyday communication and problem-solving has 
over-ridden direct relations between management and employees’ groups (see 
the above case o f the Austro-Hungarian firm). Moreover, the transfer of West­
ern managerial skills and systems is one of the most visible and urgent chal­
lenges faced by the Hungarian economic elite, given the growing influence of 
Western and multinational firms. Various forms o f teamwork, ‘lean’ and ‘flat­
ter’ organizations, the establishment o f more ‘heterarchic relations’ within or­
ganizations, the reorganization of firms’ newspapers and bulletins, group dis­
cussions, are all on the list o f new managerial initiatives. (Mako Cs. - Novoszath 
P. 1994.)
Privatization, productive decentralization, the crisis of the redistributive mecha­
nisms, the diminishing possibilities o f ‘concession policy’, the pluralization of 
employee and employer organizations - all these individually and collectively 
constitute a challenge for Hungarian labour relations. Not by chance, the social 
partners have been pressing for a ‘social pact’ since 1990.
At the national level, there is a strong need to stabilize social relations through 
centralized agreements. But at the firm level, despite the relatively high unem­
ployment rate and economic recession, high quality performance, problem-solv­
ing, adaptability, cannot be obtained through central agreements. Cooperation 
between employers and different employee groups is based on economically
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motivated collaboration, not on institutionalized and/or ideologically motivated 
social obligations. Even without public intervention, this leads to the “micro- 
cooperativism” (Streeck, 1991) constituted by the rational self-interest o f the 
social partners in employment, wages, skilling, working conditions. This ten­
dency, which has been described in the highly developed countries during the 
past decade, can be identified in some spheres o f the Hungarian economy as 
well. Thus, within the Hungarian system o f labour relations, highly heterog­
enous firm-level configurations resulting from the multiform presence o f par­
ticipation are becoming o f crucial importance. Unified and centralized models 
of labour relations are important to establish a stable political background, and 
so are norms regulating the relationship between the social partners, but their 
role in orienting firm-level labour relations should not be overestimated.
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